
Global Drone Surveys

PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION / NOVEMBER 2026

COUNTER-UAS OPERATIONAL ASSURANCE

STADIUM SECURITY ASSESSMENT / FICTIONAL CASE STUDY



ASSESSMENT RECORD

NORTHBRIDGE ARENA

A comprehensive example of the scope, methodology, simulated operational data, findings and management decisions available from a professionally governed Counter-UAS assurance engagement.

DOCUMENT STATUS

FICTIONAL VENUE / ILLUSTRATIVE RESULTS

GDS-CUAS-DEMO-001 / VERSION 1.1

Northbridge Arena | Counter-UAS assurance

PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION PREVIEW / Fictional venue and illustrative results

Why this report exists

Global Drone Surveys (GDS) presents a fictional stadium assessment to demonstrate the quality of a professional Counter-UAS operational assurance engagement. The purpose is to distinguish installed technology from the organisational ability to interpret alerts, assign responsibility, document decisions and commission meaningful improvements.

The example deliberately contains no actual protected-site configuration, sensor coverage information, tested intervention method or client-specific vulnerability. It is neither NPSA-endorsed nor a demonstration of completed GDS client work.

Illustrative assessment in brief


Evidence category	Demonstration finding
Controlled alert records	8 separate synthetic events
Alert presented to nominated channel	8 of 8 records
Acknowledgement recorded	6 of 8 records
Complete decision record	5 of 8 records
Evidence package indexed	7 of 8 records
Separate coordination exercises	4 fictional tabletop / coordination records
Improvement findings	10: 2 high, 6 medium, 2 low

Management interpretation

The fictional alert route worked for all eight scripted examples. Documentation after alert presentation was less consistent. That is a reason to improve assurance of operator ownership, handover and record-keeping — not a basis for claiming that an actual detection sensor failed or that additional hardware is necessarily required.

Governance and responsibility

The client remains accountable for operational security decisions, site procedures, police liaison where relevant and any lawful intervention. GDS provides an independent assessment function under a written, approved exercise scope. Aviation safety remains with the authorised flight team; none of these roles transfers command of a live incident to GDS.



Solid navy: client command / reporting. Dashed cyan: test coordination and independent observation.
External agencies are not under GDS command; roles are illustrative and must be agreed by the client.

Illustrative reporting relationships

The solid client command chain is separate from the assessment team. Cross-team communications are agreed before exercises. The client can halt activities for site safety, and the GDS exercise lead controls only the approved demonstration activity. Findings are delivered for client review; only the client can authorise changes to its SOPs and determine residual-risk acceptance.

Assessment approach | public overview

The full professional report uses the client's approved Operational Requirements and SOPs as its baseline. Document review, controlled exercises, observations and evidence-quality checks may then be selected in proportion to the assessed site and the permissions available. This public edition summarises the assurance process without reproducing GDS's detailed registers.



From alert to decision

A detection alert is one piece of information. The quality of the wider response depends on acknowledgement ownership, incident evaluation, documented escalation decisions, applicable lawful response powers and later evidence review. These aspects should be judged separately; demonstration of one does not prove the others.

Illustrative limitations

No live RF, radar, acoustic or optical sensor data are included. The fictional records do not establish detection range, tracking precision, false alarm rate, system reliability or mitigation efficacy. No police, Gold Command or external-agency operational involvement was exercised.

Worked finding | F-01

EXAMPLE ONLY / Acknowledgement ownership

Assessment question: Can the client demonstrate that an identified operator accepted responsibility for each relevant alert?

Observation: The fictional event register records acknowledgements for six of eight scripted alerts. Two entries contain no acknowledgement record, although both contain initial alert presentation evidence.

Careful judgement: Missing documentation does not establish that the operator took no action. The absence should first be assessed as an assurance evidence gap until further corroboration is examined.

Operational significance: Without a consistent ownership record, later reviewers may be unable to reconstruct who accepted the case, when control transferred or why a decision was made.

Recommended improvement: Confirm the primary and deputy acknowledgement roles; agree a single incident identifier; train the relevant personnel; test the revised recording method in an authorised exercise.

Verification: The client supplies an approved procedure and a sample of subsequent exercise records. The independent reviewer assesses whether the agreed criterion has been demonstrated. A published SOP alone is not grounds for closure.

Trace point	Public example
Requirement	OR-02 (illustrative)
Procedure	SOP-01 (illustrative)
Event evidence	CV-04 and CV-07
Finding / action	F-01 → A-01
Verification	Repeat record review; no closure recorded

Improvement and reassessment

GDS reports evidence-linked recommendations; the site owner commissions corrective work and records accountable owners. A finding remains open until there is reliable implementation evidence and, where necessary, a further controlled observation. A client may separately document its acceptance of residual risk.



Example management priorities

Area	Example management response
Acknowledgement	Clarify ownership and preserve exception records
Inter-team handover	Adopt a single traceable incident record
Training	Link briefings to the current approved procedure
Evidence custody	Assign record owner and retention responsibilities
Reassessment	Repeat comparable exercise definitions after correction

Future assurance

The fictional baseline of 8/8 alerts, 6/8 acknowledgements, 5/8 decision records and 7/8 indexed evidence packages supports a demonstration comparison of documentation completeness only. Any meaningful subsequent comparison must record the approved assessment criteria, operating conditions, team composition and system changes.

Management conclusion and next steps

The Northbridge Arena example shows how apparently successful technical alert presentation can coexist with procedural weaknesses in subsequent records. This illustrates the value of independent operational assurance: it directs attention towards the evidence actually available and encourages proportional improvements instead of assuming a universal technology failure.

A real GDS engagement would begin with a written scope, lawful authorisations and client-provided requirements and procedures. The resulting report would identify confirmed observations, exclusions and limitations, then support client-owned corrective actions and targeted revalidation.

Important publication boundary

This is an intentionally restricted public demonstration. The detailed Operational Requirements crosswalk, complete SOP matrix, ten-item findings register, underlying event ledger, corrective-action tracker and reusable verification templates are reserved for controlled professional review and are not reproduced here.

Reference and disclaimer

The approach is informed by UK National Protective Security Authority guidance on developing Operational Requirements for C-UAS Detect, Track and Identify technology. NPSA has not endorsed this document or GDS.

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